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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is the filing by a person claiming benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 
et. seq of a notice of a claim for a mechanic's lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7, barred 
when said person has previously filed two claims for a mechanic's liens under Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-7 for the exact same work but did not file an action to enforce the previously 
filed notice of claims within the time limits set forth in Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11. 
Standard of Review: Matter of trial court's statutory interpretations for 
correctness Wagner Associated v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (UT App. 1990) 
Preservation for Appeal: The issue was properly preserved for appeal having 
been ruled upon by the Trial Court 
2. After failing to file an action to enforce two previously filed notice of 
claims, is the Lien Claimant entitled to file a third notice of claim on the exact same 
work? 
Standard of Review: Matter of trial court's statutory interpretations for 
correctness Wagner Associated v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (UT App. 1990) 
Preservation for Appeal: The issue was properly preserved for appeal having 
been ruled upon by the Trial Court 
3. Having filed a third notice of claim on the exact same work as two 
previous notices of claims, of which the Lien Claimant failed to enforce its rights through 
a foreclosure thereof, are the procedures under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1 et. seq applicable 
for expedited disposition of said third lien claim. 
Standard of Review: Matter of trial court's statutory interpretations for 
correctness Wagner Associated v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (UT App. 1990) 
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Preservation for Appeal: The issue was properly preserved for appeal 
having been ruled upon by the Trial Court 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property. 
38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Service on owner of property. 
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits 
under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in 
which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien within: 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or 
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under 
Section 38-1-33. 
(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1), final completion of the original 
contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final completion of the project, 
means: 
(A) if as a result of work performed under the original contract a permanent 
certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of issuance of a 
permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project; 
(B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by the local government entity 
having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a result of the work 
performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per state-
adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work 
by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; 
or 
(C) if with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate 
of occupancy and no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building 
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codes by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction 
project, the date on which there remains no substantial work to be completed to 
finish the work on the original contract. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs 
substantial work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) 
and (B), that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract 
for the sole purpose of determining: 
(i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a 
lien under this Subsection (1); and 
(ii) the original contractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and 
claim a lien under this Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: 
(i) repair work; or 
(ii) warranty work. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original 
contract does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is 
holding payment to ensure completion of that work. 
(2) (a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting 
forth: 
(i) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner; 
(ii) the name of the person: 
(A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or 
(B) to whom the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(iii) the time when: 
(A) the first and last labor or service was performed; or 
(B) the first and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(v) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; 
(vi) the amount of the lien claim; 
(vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents; and 
(ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 38-11-
102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 38-11-
102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance with 
Section 38-11-107. 
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient 
to hold and claim a lien. 
(3) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall 
deliver or mail by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: 
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien 
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of 
the record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last 
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completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules 
governing the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix). 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action for debt not affected — 
Instructions and form affidavit and motion, 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Owner" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(b) "Residence" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter 
within 180 days from the day on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim under 
Section 38-1-7. 
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (2) the lien claimant 
shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded 
a notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the 
title or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons 
who have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those claiming under the lien 
claimant to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) (a) A lien filed under this chapter is automatically and immediately void if an 
action to enforce the lien is not filed within the time required by this section. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 78-12-40, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a lien that becomes void under Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to 
whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal 
action to recover the debt. 
(6) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter 
involving a residence, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on 
the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 
38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form to enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the 
owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The instructions and form required by Subsection (6)(a) shall meet the 
requirements established by rule by the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. 
(c) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and 
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form required by Subsection (6)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or 
enforcing the lien upon the residence. 
(d) Judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the owner of the residence 
under this chapter and Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act, and Title 14, Chapter 2, Private Contracts, shall be stayed until after 
the owner is given a reasonable period of time to establish compliance with Subsections 
38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b) through an informal proceeding, as set forth in Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, commenced within 30 days of the owner 
being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of compliance or denial of certificate of 
compliance, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(e) An owner applying for a certificate of compliance under Subsection (6)(d) shall 
send by certified mail to all lien claimants: 
(i) a copy of the application for a certificate of compliance; and 
(ii) all materials filed in connection with the application. 
(f) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall notify all lien 
claimants listed in an owner's application for a certificate of compliance under Subsection 
(6)(d) of the issuance or denial of a certificate of compliance. 
(7) The written notice requirement applies to liens filed on or after July 1, 2004. 
38-9-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property 
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or 
beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien or 
other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real 
property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in 
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain 
real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which 
the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance 
on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real 
property. 
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38-9-2. Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38-9-6 apply to any 
recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on 
or after May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of record regardless 
of the date the lien was recorded or filed. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens 
in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who 
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien — Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real 
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately 
caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the 
wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a record interest 
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of 
the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 
38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or 
having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien — Notice to lien claimant — Summary relief — 
Finding of wrongful lien — Wrongful lien is void. 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court in the 
county in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful 
lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest holder. 
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition 
without a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a hearing 
within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien 
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claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, 
Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not 
a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other 
property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party. 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the 
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the wrongful 
lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien, and awarding costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees to the petitioner. 
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the order with 
the county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property. 
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss 
the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. 
The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the real property. The 
prevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy of the dismissal order. 
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of claim 
or interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not 
be expedited under this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter Foothill Park) instituted suit to nullify 
Defendant/Appellant's (hereinafter Judston) notice of lien as a wrongful lien on a parcel 
of real property situated in Utah County, Utah (Civl No. 060102680). 
Judston countersued for an alleged unpaid balance of $98,017.90 together with 
$500 in court costs and $775 in attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court found Judston's September 24, 2004 Mechanic's Lien, 
hereinafter referred to as the "First Lien", and the January 11, 2005 Amended Mechanic's 
Lien, hereinafter referred to as the "Second Lien", void as a matter of law as a result of 
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Judston's failure to file an action foreclosing said liens within the 180 day provided in 
section 38-1 -11U.C.A. 
The lower Court further found the July 14, 2006, Mechanic's Lien filed by 
Judston, hereinafter referred to as the 'Third Lien", for the same work represented in the 
First Lien and Second Lien, to be a wrongful lien and the Court voided the Third Lien 
lien. 
Therefore the lower Court entered a judgment in favor of Foothill Park and 
against Judston for statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00 together with $4,710.00 
attorney's fees and $ 500.00 court costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Foothill Park seeks affirmation of the decision of the district court and an award 
of attorneys fees in favor of Foothill Park. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about October 7, 2003, Foothill Park, L.C. caused NorthStar 
Companies, Inc. to enter into a contract with Judston, wherein Judston agreed to provide 
land development services to Foothill Park to develop the Foothill Park Subdivision, 
located in Provo, Utah. 
2. Judston last performed work for Foothill Park on or about August 17, 
2004. 
3. On or about September 27, 2004, Judston recorded a Notice of Lien with 
the Office of the County Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, at Provo, Utah, Entry No. 
110030:2004 on Foothill Park's the real property, Judston's First Lien. 
4. Judston breached the October 7, 2003 contract by not completing the work 
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within the time limits contemplated in said contract, and not performing the work defined 
in the contract in a satisfactory manner. 
5. Judston filed an Amended Notice of Lien on January 11, 2005 with the 
Office of the County Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, Provo, Utah, Entry No. 
3199:2005, Judston's Second Lien. 
6. The Notice of Claim of Lien filed by Judston on September 27, 2004 was 
released by Judston. 
7. Foothill Park escrowed monies, which Foothill Park was required to pay to 
other contractors to come in and complete the contracted work that Judston did not 
perform either in a satisfactory manner or had left unfinished. 
8. Judston filed, made, recorded or uttered the wrongful lien and filed a third 
Notice of Lien dated March 15, 2005 but was not recorded with the Office of the County 
Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, at Provo, Utah, Entry No. 89109:2006 until July 
14, 2006, which is over sixteen (16) months after Judston prepared and signed it, 
Judston's Third Lien. 
9. It was conceded by Judston that all Notice of Lien filings were based and 
predicated upon the same work performed prior to August 17, 2004. 
10. The lower Court granted Foothill Park's Motion for an Expedited Hearing 
pursuant to UCA §38-9-1 et. seq and the lower Court ruled as set forth above. 
11. Judston failed to argue before the trial court how U.C.A. §38-1-25 may 
applied in this matter. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. It was conceded by Judston that all liens filed in this matter were based 
and predicated upon the same work that ended when Judston left the work on August 17, 
2004. 
2. The time for enforcing a mechanic's lien, set forth in Section 38-1-11 
supra, UCA, limits a lien claimant's rights to 180 days after filing a notice of a lien. 
3. Pursuant to Judston's First Lien, filed September 27, 2004, Judston had 
until March 23, 2005 to file an action to enforce its lien. 
3. If Judston successfully argues that the 180 days begins anew upon 
amending the First Lien lien on January 11, 2005, Judston had until July 10, 2005 to file 
an action to enforce its amended lien, the Second Lien.. 
4. Judston failed to file any action to enforce its liens, original or amended, 
within the 180 days set forth in Section 38-1-11 supra. UCA. 
5. Judston's lien automatically and immediately became void when Judston 
failed to file an action to enforce said lien within 180 days of filing said lien. Thereafter, 
Judston's claim is barred for failure to institute its claims within the time prescribed by 
Section 38-1-11, UCA. 
6. Judston's rights and remedies regarding their claims, under the statute, are 
extinguished. 
7. As of July 10, 2005, Judston was not entitled to a lien, based and 
predicated upon the same work, under Section 38-1-1 et seq UCA. 
8. Judston's Third Lien, filed July 14, 2006, was a wrongful lien and, 
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pursuant to Section 38-9-7(c) UCA, Foothill Park was properly awarded damages, 
attorney's fees, and costs. 
9. Judston failed to argue before the trial court how U.C.A. §38-1-25 may 
applied in this matter and, therefore, should be barred from bringing that argument before 
this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
JUDSTON WAS REQUIRED TO COMMENCE AN ACTION TO 
FORECLOSE ITS LIEN WITHIN 180 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT 
FILED A NOTICE OF CLAIM UNDER SECTION 38-1-7 UCA. 
Mechanics' liens were created by statute and have no common law history. The 
purpose of the Utah mechanics lien law is to provide protection to those who enhance the 
value of property by supplying labor and/or materials. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. 
Navaico, Utah, 648 P.2d 1382 (UT 1982). However, strict compliance with the statute is 
required before a party is entitled to the benefits created by the statute. First Security 
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, Utah, 631 P.2 919 (UT 1981). 
The first issue to be addressed by this Court requires an examination of the plain 
language of the Section 38-1-11, UCA. See Centennial Investment Company v. Nuttall, 
2007 UT App. 321, f 18, citing Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 
P.2d 207 ("The plain language controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is 
ambiguity do we look beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy 
considerations."). Additionally, statutes are interpreted "to give meaning to all parts, and 
avoid rendering portions of the statute superfluous." Centennial, f 18, citing LKL Assoc, 
v. Farley, 2004 UT 51 f 7, 94 P.3d 279. 
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The relevant plain language of the UCA § 38-1-11(2) states that "[a] lien claimant 
shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within 180 days from the 
day on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7." Thus, in 
unambiguous terms, the statute requires that the Lien Claimant, Judston in this instance, 
file an action to enforce its lien within 180 days from the date of filing a notice of the 
lien. 
The calendar of Judston's lien filings clearly shows that Judston failed to comply 
with the timely filing of any action(s) to enforce its liens. Notice of Judston's First Lien 
was filed September 27, 2004. Therefore, Judston had until March 23, 2005 to file an 
action to enforce its lien. Judston failed to file any action in the time set forth in the 
statute. 
Judston filed it's Second Lien by amending its September 27, 2004 lien on 
January 11, 2005. Even if the amendment is deemed to extend the time Judston had to 
file an action to enforce its lien, Judston had until July 10, 2005 to file such an action. 
Once again, Judston failed to take the action necessary within the statutory 180 days. 
Pursuant to the statute, the trial court could only rule that the time to file an action 
on Judston's lien(s) had expired. 
POINT 2 
JUDSTON LOST ITS LIEN RIGHTS AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT FAILED TO COMMENCE AN ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS LIEN 
WITHIN THE 180 DAY PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 38-1-
11 UCA. 
U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) reads as follows: "A lien filed under this chapter is 
automatically and immediately void if an action to enforce the lien is not filed within the 
time required by this section." The unambiguous language of the statute is clear. The 
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facts are clear. Judston failed to enforce any of its liens within 180 days. Therefore, 
Judston's First Lien and the Second Lien, as prescribed by statute, are void. 
Moreover, pursuant to Section 38-1-11, "[notwithstanding Section 78-12-40, a 
court has no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a lien that becomes void under 
Subsection (4)(a)." U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(4)(b). Therefore, the trial court could not even 
address Judston's First or Second Liens, having no jurisdiction in the subject matter. 
POINT 3 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT JUDSTON'S LIEN RIGHTS 
HAD BEEN VOIDED AS A MATTER OF LAW ON OR BEFORE 
JANUARY 11, 2005. JUDSTON FILED A THIRD LIEN ON JULY 14, 
2006. 
Judston admits to filing its Third Lien, filed July 14, 2006, based and predicated 
upon the exact same work, performed during the exact same time period. Judston's right 
to a lien for this work was extinguished by failing to enforce the previous lien(s). "The 
time for enforcing mechanics' liens set out in section 38-1-11, supra, limits a lienor's 
right to twelve months after his work is completed. At that point, both his rights and his 
remedies under the statute are extinguished." AAA Fencing v. Raintree, 714 P.2d 289, 
292 (UT 1986). While the current statute shortens the window for a claimant to enforce a 
lien to 180 days, the premise remains the same. However, for reasons only known to 
Judston, it did not enforce its lien within the time prescribed by law. Therefore, pursuant 
to the AAA Fence decision, Judston's rights and remedies under the statute are 
extinguished. In other words, Judston has lost all rights to claim any Mechanic's Lien for 
the work and materials claimed, by reason of Judston's failure to adhere to the statutory 
procedures. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has found that there must be strict compliance with a 
designated statutory procedure for the bringing of claims created by that statute. See 
State v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 102 UT 284, 115 P2d 913 (UT 1941). 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in ruling that Judston's First and Second Liens are 
void. 
Moreover, UCA § 38-1-11(5) reads as follows: "[t]his section may not be 
interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt may be due for any 
work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the debt." This 
section suggests that the legislature contemplated that U.C.A. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did 
extinguish a claimant's right to file subsequent liens based and predicated upon the same 
work. The legislature, by including UCA § 38-1-11(5), provided errant claimants other 
avenues of pursuing collection of a debt which may be due for any work done or 
materials furnished. Judston's contrary interpretation would render portions of the statute 
meaningless or nonsensical. See Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1980) ("[Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which render some 
part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.") Section 38-11 et. seq should be read as a 
whole to (1) require a lien claimant to commence a mechanic's lien action within 180 
days of filing a notice of lien or the lien becomes void and (2) if a lien becomes void, the 
lien claimant the right to maintain a personal action or lawsuit to recover the debt due for 
any work done or materials furnished. 
Judston attempts to argue that its Third Lien should not fall under U.C.A. §38-9-1 
et. seq. because Judston was entitled to file the Third Lien. If Judston had filed no prior 
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liens, which were voided as a matter of law, Judston's argument may be correct. 
However, Judston filed a First and Second Lien, both of which were voided as a matter of 
law due to Judston's failure to file an action to foreclose its lien rights. 
Wherefore, Judston's rights and remedies under U.C.A. §38-1-7 were 
extinguished. Therefore, Judston was not entitled to file the Third Lien and that lien is 
controlled by U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et. seq as a wrongful lien. 
POINT 4 
JUDSTON'S THIRD LIEN CONSTITUTED A WRONGFUL 
LIEN, PURSUANT TO SECTION 38-9-1 ET. SEQ UCA 
It was incumbent upon the trial court, having found Judston's First nd Second 
Liens void for failure to follow the procedure to enforce said liens pursuant to UCA § 38-
l-ll(4)(a), to find Judston's subsequent Notice of Lien, based and predicated upon the 
same work, a wrongful lien. 
While Judston correctly argues that UCA § 38-1-3, UCA, identifies those entitled 
to lien, this argument fails to note that Judston is no longer entitled to lien pursuant to 
UCA § 38-1-3. Judston's rights have been extinguished and, therefore, Judston is no 
longer entitled to a lien, so long as said lien is based and predicated upon the same work 
as claimed under the First and Second Liens, which are void. 
Therefore, not being entitled to a lien, Judston's Third Lien necessarily falls under 
UCA § 38-9-1 et. seq. 
UCA § 38-9-1(6) provides, in pertinent part: 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
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jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
real property. 
The clear and unambiguous language of § 38-9-1(6) takes into account the 
language of § 38-1-3, as set forth in Judston's arguments. However, § 38-1-11, also 
contained in this chapter, sets forth the procedural requirements to enforce a lien, as well 
as the consequences of a claimant's failure to follow the procedure established therein. 
Judston attempts to raise the issue, for the first time in this appeal, that U.C.A. § 
38-1-25 should govern this matter. Judston should be barred from raising this issue on 
appeal because it was not argued before the trial court. See Heideman et al v. 
Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, 155 P.3d 900 (UT App. 2007). However, upon a 
reading of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 38-1-25, it clearly addresses 
persons entitled to file a lien and who intentionally claim a greater sum than is due for the 
work or materials provided. Specifically Section 38-1-25 reads as follows: 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien 
against any property containing a greater demand than the sum due to be 
recorded or filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive 
claim of lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person 
who violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an 
original contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the 
greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the abusive lien exceeds the amount 
actually due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
U.C.A. § 38-1-25 is clearly inapplicable in this present matter. 
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Judston properly points out that "the intention of the legislature in enacting the 
Wrongful Lien statute was to provide an expedited procedure for resolution of lien claims 
based on documents recorded or filed not '(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or 
another state or federal statute... '". Judston's Third Lien was not authorized by 
Chapter 38 of the Utah Code Annotated. After failing to foreclose its lien rights and 
remedies on the First and Second Liens, based and predicated on the exact same work as 
the Third Lien is based, Judston's rights and remedies have been extinguished and, 
therefore, the Third Lien is a wrongful lien. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Foothill respectfully asks this Court to affirm and 
uphold the trial court's ruling that Judston's First and Second Liens were void as a matter 
of law and, therefore, Judston was not entitled to a Third Lien on the same work and said 
Third Lien was a wrongful lien. Furthermore, pursuant to U.C.A. 38-1-18, Foothill 
hereby requests an award of attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Date: September 19, 2007 
Charles W. Hanna 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I * day of October, 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Dane L. Hines 
Attorney at Law 
210 West 200 North #206 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Legal Assistant 
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ADDENDUM 
Charles W. Hanna (Bar No. 1326) 
223 West Bulldog Ave. Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-3650 
Fax:(801)375-3670 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
FOOTHILL PARK, L.C. a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
JUDSTON, INC., a Utah Corporation, C A S E N O - 060102680 
Judge: Pullan 
Defendant 
JUDSTON, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimant and 
Third Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
NORTHSTAR COMPANIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation 
Third Party7 Defendant | _ ___ 
A hearing on Plaintiff Foothill Park, L.C.'s Motion to Annul a Wrongful Lien came on 
regularly before the Court on February 5, 2007, the Plaintiff being present and represent by its 
attorney Charles W. Hanna and the Defendant being present and represented by its attorney Dane 
i - - C £ 
L. Hines and the Court having read the memorandums filed herein heard the argument of counsel 
now hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Judston. Inc., has filed three mechanic's liens against the real property 
owned by Plaintiff Foothill Park, L.C 
2. On September 24, 2004, Judston Inc. filed a lien against the real property of Foothill 
Park, L.C. in the amount of $120,246.13. 
3. On January 11, 2005, Judston, Inc. filed an Amended Lien in the amount of $82,749.67 
4. Judston, Inc. did not file an action to foreclose either its September 2004 lien or its 
January 2005 lien within the 180 days required by Section 38-1-11(1). 
5. On July 14, 2006, Judston Inc. filed a lien in the amount of $98,017.91. 
6. All three liens filed by Defendant Judston Inc., relate to the exact same work which 
was completed on August 17, 2004. 
7. The third lien filed by Judston Inc., was filed before a final inspection of the work of 
Judston Inc., had been performed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Nullify a Wrongful Lien 
filed pursuant to 38-9-7 U.C.A. 
2. The Wrongful Lien Statute by its terms cannot apply to a person entitled to a lien under 
the Mechanic's Lien Statute 31-1-1 et seq., as a lien authorized by Statute is exempted from the 
definition of a wrongful lien by Section 38-9-1(6) (b). 
3. A person who files an untimely mechanics lien is not as a matter of law entitled to a 
lien under 38-1-1 et seq. 
4. An untimely filed mechanics lien may constitute a wrongful lien under Section 38-9-1 
et seq., and properly be the subject of a motion to nullify a wrongful lien. 
5. This court holds that the July 2006 lien filed by Defendant Judston. Inc., constitutes a 
wrongful lien. 
6. The failure of Defendant Judston, Inc., to file an action to foreclose its September 2004 
and January 2005 mechanic's liens within the 180 days provided in Section 38-1-11(1) 
extinguished any lien rights associated with these liens pursuant to the holdings of the Utah 
Supreme Court in AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree Development and Energy Company 714 
P.2d 289 and Projects Unlimited, Inc., vs. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co. 798 P.2d 738. Once 
these lien rights have been extinguished as a matter of law, this court lost subject matter 
jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate a lien which has become void for this reason. 
7. The holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree 
Development and Energy Company 714 P.2d 289 and Projects Unlimited, Inc., vs. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co. 798 P.2d 738 have been codified in section 38-1-11(3) which became 
effective on May 1, 2006 prior to Defendant Judston Inc., filing its tliird mechanic's lien in July 
2006. 
8. The subsequent filing of Defendant Judston, Inc., of the July 2006 mechanic's lien 
after its right to file or enforce a mechanic's lien had been extinguished as a matter of law 
constituted the filing of a wrongful lien. 
9. Plaintiff Foothill Park, L.C. is entitled to $1,000.00 statutory damages pursuant to 38-
9-1 U.C.A. and to an award of its attorney's fees and costs. See Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs filed herewith. 
DATED AND SIGNED this P 6 day of March, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
